ABSTRACT
European Union agencies have been studied explicitly or implicitly from two distinct perspectives: an intergovernmental or a supranational point of view. Both relate to broader dynamics and aim to understand the forces that EU agencies respond to. However, different authors have pointed out that both perspectives can be observed simultaneously in EU agencies. This is because they combine intergovernmental coordination and access to supranational power with different intensities under conditions of institutional isolation and a strong professional identity. This article takes as its starting point this integrating vision and argues that EU agencies function as a new type of regional trans-governmental body that is flexible, adapts to the new age of global governance and actively participates in it. The paper discusses the literature on EU agencies along these lines and concludes with a plea to favour an analysis that includes global governance, in order to better understand how these bodies operate in transnational spaces. The fragmentation of sovereignty into multiple levels and regulatory spaces, where complex sectorial systems take on a global dimension to produce public goods, requires articulating hybrid institutional structures. EU agencies respond perfectly to this need as their institutional design endows them with a strong capacity for multilevel interaction.
Keywords: EU agencies; intergovernmentalism; supranationalism; transnationalism; global governance.
RESUMEN
El estudio de las agencias de la Unión Europea se ha realizado, explícita o implícitamente, a partir de dos lógicas distintas: una lógica intergubernamental y una supranacional. Ambas lógicas se relacionan con dinámicas más amplias que tienen como objetivo comprender las fuerzas a las que responde el surgimiento de las mismas. Recientemente, diversos autores han señalado que ambas perspectivas pueden considerarse simultáneamente, entendiendo que las agencias de la UE combinan la coordinación intergubernamental y el acceso al poder supranacional con diferentes intensidades, según las temáticas que abordan, en condiciones de aislamiento institucional y una fuerte identidad profesional. Este artículo parte de esta visión integradora para argumentar que las agencias de la UE funcionan como un nuevo tipo de organismo regional transgubernamental que es flexible y se adapta a la nueva era de la gobernanza global, participando en ella activamente. En esta línea, la fragmentación de la soberanía en múltiples niveles y espacios reguladores, donde complejos sistemas sectoriales toman una dimensión global para producir bienes públicos de alcance mundial, conlleva la necesidad de articular estructuras institucionales de carácter hibrido, con elevadas capacidades de interacción multinivel, algo a lo que el diseño institucional de la agencias de la UE responde perfectamente.
Palabras clave: Agencias Europeas; intergubernamentalismo; supranacionalismo; transnacionalismo; gobernanza global.
It has been claimed that the agencification of public administration at the European
level is a reconfiguration of the EU executive power ( Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009). National Agencies in the European Administrative
Space: Government-Driven, Commission-Driven or Networked? Public Administration, 87 (4), 779-790. Available at:
Up to now, approaches of scholars studying EU agencies have either emphasised the
intergovernmental nature of agencies or discussed the relevance of an emerging supranational
logic in their development ( Egeberg, M., Trondal, J. and Vestlund, N. (2015). The Quest for Order: Unravelling
the Relationship between the European Commission and European Union Agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 22 (5), 609-629. Available at:
Against this backdrop, in this paper we ask to what extent considering a global governance
perspective contributes to a better understanding of EU agencies, providing a view
that is complementary to the current debates. We argue that this perspective could
help the academic community better interpret some characteristics of EU agencies,
as well as their behaviour, one in which the intergovernmental and supranational logics
may coexist depending on the characteristics of each policy area and the dynamics
of global governance. In fact, EU agencies are often considered singular artefacts
that combine intergovernmental coordination and potential access to supranational
power with different levels of intensity under conditions of institutional isolation
and strong professional identities ( Dehousse, R. (2008). Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for a Multi-Principals
Model. West European Politics, 31 (4), 789-805. Available at:
In their daily operations, EU agencies respond to multiple interactions based on the mandate, tasks and operations they perform, combining intergovernmental and supranational dynamics to different degrees. They are made up of representatives from EU institutions, member states and, in some cases, stakeholders related to the agency’s policy area, all of which have some level of influence on the agencies’ policy-making. In this paper we aim to further develop the conceptual operationalisation of EU agencies’ role in European governance by introducing the global governance perspective. Our paper is an attempt to conceptually expand the geographical, organisational and legal boundaries in which agencies have traditionally been studied.
This paper is divided as follows: first, we introduce the global governance perspective in relation to EU agencies, discussing how it might contribute to inspiring arguments about their activities. Next, we examine how the global governance framework can contribute to clarifying the transnational logic of EU agencies’ activities. Finally, we put forward a plea that EU agencies be studied further as artefacts under the framework of the dynamics of global governance, for which we also provide examples.
Scholars of public administration and European integration have paid enormous attention
to the growth and consolidation of the agencification process in the EU. Researchers
on EU agencies perceive these organisations as autonomous and specialised and as having
a clear mandate within specific areas in which different principals are involved (e.g.,
the Council, the European Commission, member states). They define EU agencies as “EU-level
public authorities with a legal personality and a certain degree of organisational
and financial autonomy that are created by acts of secondary legislation to perform
clearly specific tasks” ( Kelemen, D. (2002). The Politics of Eurocratic Structure and the New European Agencies.
West European Politics, 25 (4), 93-118. Available at:
The intergovernmental logic defends the notion that EU agencies were created as a mechanism to implement or monitor
policies that were jointly approved by the member states ( Thatcher, M. and Coen, D. (2008). Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary
Analysis. West European Politics, 31 (4), 806-836. Available at:
Unlike the intergovernmental approach, the supranational logic holds that having a supranational authority brings about a change in the expectations
and behaviour of social actors, “who in turn shift some of the resources and policy
efforts to the supranational level” ( Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (2012). Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance.
In E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (pp. 18-33). Oxford: Oxford University press.Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012: 20). The supranational logic also defends the fact that the EU promoted an integrated
and uniform administration ( Olsen, J. (2007). Europe in Search of Political Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Olsen, 2007). With this logic, agencies are instruments to manage and centralise regulatory functions
at the EU level ( Majone, G. (2005). Dilemmas of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at:
Studying agencies through the intergovernmental and supranational lens has been part
of the exercise to understand their origin and expansion. The early formation of networks
of national agencies throughout Europe in key areas ( Maggetti, M. and Gilardi, F. (2014). Network Governance and the Domestic Adoption
of Soft Rules. Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (9), 1293-1310. Available at:
Blauberger and Rittberger ( Blauberger, M. and Rittberger, B. (2015). Conceptualising and Theorising EU Regulatory
Networks. Regulation and Governance, 9 (4), 367-376. Available at:
From a political perspective, it might be argued that the European Commission promoted EU agencies as a strategy
for expanding administrative capacities at the European level and beyond. There are
many possible reasons for this aim to develop additional supranational capabilities,
in spite of strong resistance from the member states, including expectations to increase
the Commission’s leadership role within regulatory global governance ( Busuioc, M. (2013). European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at:
These concepts leave us with a varied picture of functional and political arguments about the creation and design of EU agencies that also reflect the theoretical and empirical tensions between the intergovernmental and supranational logics. However, the Eurocentric view of these logics prevent us from being able to zoom out to take in global initiatives that make EU agencies into actors that develop their own transnational space. Given the development of European regulatory frameworks in multiple areas and the relevance of expanding these frameworks beyond Europe, it appears that EU agencies have progressively become more relevant to this purpose.
According to Dohler ( Dohler, M. (2011). Regulation. In M. Bevir (ed). The SAGE Handbook of Governance (pp. 518-534). London: SAGE. Available at:
To understand EU agencies in the framework of global governance, we need to remember
the role of the EU as a global actor aiming to lead political, social and economic
developments. A classic definition of global governance is “systems of rule at all
levels of human activity–from the family to the international organisation —in which
the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”
( Rosenau, J. (1995). Governance in the Twenty-First Century. Global Governance, 1 (1), 13-43. Available at:
Although transnationalism has mainly been applied to the European regulatory space,
this logic is a starting point to open the scope of EU agencies towards global governance.
As specialised bodies with expert knowledge and a specific mandate that virtually
isolate them from political pressures, EU agencies can be considered organisations
with the capacity to (a) guide the interplay between state and nonstate actors and
(b) move beyond a specific space to participate in broader global regulatory networks
(based on Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at:
From the literature, we identify that the policy area an agency belongs to may guide how far they are able to navigate in a global context. From this central feature, the literature on EU agencies help us to identify other characteristics that can strengthen or weaken their transnational space in a framework of global governance: the political independence they enjoy, the authority relationship they have with other actors and their specialised nature. Below we will we reflect upon these elements.
Different interests and aspirations embedded in specific policy areas mean that EU agencies are organisations with connections to actors that place them
closer or further away from intergovernmental or supranational logics. EU agencies
base their actions on their mandate but also on informal procedures and practices
that sometimes are out of reach of the principals behind their design. The degree
of conflict between political actors and the likelihood of coercion necessary to enforce
a policy depends on the type of decision the agency is able to make but also the policy
area it belongs to ( Dohler, M. (2011). Regulation. In M. Bevir (ed). The SAGE Handbook of Governance (pp. 518-534). London: SAGE. Available at:
Thinking in global governance terms helps to systematise the constellation of actors
and interests that affect agencies’ transnational space in different policy areas.
Abbott and Snidal ( Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening International Regulation through
Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 (2), 441-500. Available at:
Actors such as agencies can address all kinds of transnational challenges related
to harmonising global financial markets, environmental efforts and health prevention
issues ( Keohane, R. (2001). Governance in a Partially Globalized World. American Political Science Review, 95 (1), 1-13.Keohane, 2001: 2-3). However, their role will be expanded or limited by the nature of their tasks and
how they are aligned with the policy area they belong to. In fact, the denationalisation
of regulatory policies and the entrance of nonstate actors, as well as public opinion,
have contributed to differentiated needs according to the policy area in question
( van Kersbergen, K. and van Waarden, F. (2004). “Governance” as a Bridge Between Disciplines:
Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability,
Accountability and Legitimacy. European Journal of Political Research, 43 (2), 143-171. Available at:
Within the policy area, the authority relationship emerges as an element that facilitates (or not) the agency’s incorporation into a
framework of global governance. In every governance structure there is a basic authority
relationship based on the recognition of different actors. If we place EU agencies
in this context then we can expect these relationships to affect the expansion of
their transnational space. Galaz et al. (2017: 12) claim that emerging forms of governance entail collaboration between different
administrative levels, epistemic communities and nonstate actors. In this universe,
agencies may enhance transnational ties by “supporting information-sharing, collaboration,
experimentation and conflict resolution” on a global scale. Moreover, agencies might
be part of the coordination of responses to different cross-national and global challenges
that affect a multiplicity of actors. In those areas where global exchanges among
different actors are more developed, we will see a more active role for the EU agency
under a global governance framework. In those areas where global exchanges are not
as developed, EU agencies may encounter more difficulties in expanding their transnational
space. Drawing from Zürn ( Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at:
The literature has argued extensively that the more supranational an agency becomes,
the more independent it will be when carrying out its tasks, no matter whether these cover a broad range
of issues or not ( Pollitt, C. and Talbot, C. (eds.) (2004). Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos
and Contractualisation. London: Routledge. Available at:
Finally, agencies can be said to be specialised, nonmajoritarian bodies with a functional mandate in different policy areas. They enjoy
a level of expertise that endows them with capacities that, depending on the policy
area, may reinforce a more technical and less hierarchical relationship with other
actors (e.g., aviation safety, food safety, environment) ( Thatcher, M. (2011). The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and Its Limits:
A Comparative Analysis of European Delegation. Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (6), 790-809. Available at:
The embeddedness of agencies in a framework of global governance can be seen as the
outcome of the structural characteristics of the policy area but also as the outcome
of emerging issues that require global answers. In fact, the way agencies are able
to expand their global reach based on their specialised nature and knowledge may become
evident in critical junctures with implications around the globe. This is linked to
the purpose-driven or non-purpose-driven logic that guides their position in this
scenario. The 2012 European banking crisis mostly affecting Southern Europe and the
role of the European Banking Authority (EBA) illustrate this move. The literature
has claimed that the global interconnection of the financial sector and the common
risks actors may face all over the world made of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) at the EU level —and the EBA in particular— a visible actor in the European
response to global financial shocks ( Howarth, D., Quaglia, L. and Gren, J. (2015). Supranational banking supervision in
Europe: The construction of a credible watchdog. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 [s. 1]. Available at:
The interrelated character of the abovementioned features results in situations that illustrate the way EU agencies expand or constrain their transnational space and, therefore, their global reach. The literature on EU agencies has focused on two sectors where the abovementioned dynamics seem to be quite evident: human public health and migration.
Public health has received scholarly attention in the last two decades at the EU level
( Mossialos, E., Baeten, R., Permanand, G. and Hervey, T. K. (eds.). (2010). Health systems governance in Europe: the role of European Union law and policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at:
Migration policy has not been considered in the literature as a global governance
stronghold ( Dauvergne, C. (2009). Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at:
This paper reviewed the existing literature on EU agencies, aiming to open up the scope of those studies by looking at them from the perspective of global governance. To do so, we built on existing knowledge on transnationalism and its application to EU institutions, including EU agencies. From their emergence in the 1960s through their evolution during the different waves of agency creation, EU agencies have been seen as public bodies that apparently respond better than their national analogues to the administrative and policy needs of other EU institutions. In terms of functional motives, agencies are the outcome of a consensus to endow EU institutions with specialised bodies that harmonise rules for specific policy areas while offering credible information. Our line of reasoning prompts us to consider the development of a transnational space at a global scale to be essential to strengthening the role of these organisations in the governance of particular policy areas worldwide.
However, our approach to the role of EU agencies in a global governance framework called into question the notion of agencies as organisations that are capable of building their own transnational space thanks to the differentiated policy areas they operate in as well as their specialised nature within the EU, where they operate as a cushion between national and European institutions. These elements provide them with the independence and autonomy to relate to different actors and develop responses that converge with parallel developments in other parts of the planet. However, as Zürn ( Zürn, M. (2010). Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance. In H. Enderlein, S. Walti and M. Zürn (eds.). Handbook on Multi-Level Governance (pp 80-99). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.2010: 86) warns, the changes regarding regulation should “by no means be read as an indication of the demise of the nation-state”. This is because the role of EU agencies is constrained by developments in certain denationalised issue areas and not in others, a factor which also strengthened supranational attitudes in these areas. This is also the case because often the nation-state is still needed to implement those issues discussed at a more global scale. Moreover, as we discussed above, actors, such as EU agencies, are embedded in complex sectorial systems where the dynamics of national sovereignty are still present, constraining their transnational space at the European and global scales.
The regulation of policy sectors on a global scale brings forward EU agencies as central
components in the construction of a networked multilevel governance (based on Stubb, A., Wallace, H. and Peterson, J. (2003). The Policy-Making Process. In E. Bomberg
and A. Stubb (eds.). The European Union: How Does It Work (pp. 136-155). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Stubb et al., 2003: 148). In this context, coordination is seen as a core element in the effort to integrate
and harmonise different pieces within the framework. The changing nature of the problems
that Europe is currently facing (e.g., terrorism, the refugee crisis and systemic
economic problems) require nonstandard policy solutions based on establishing coordinative
tools to cope with vertical and horizontal interdependencies ( Peters, G. and Wright, V. (2001). The National Coordination of European Policy Making.
In J. J. Richardson (ed). European Union: Power and Policy Making, London: Routledge.Peters and Wright, 2001: 158; Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006). The Coordination of the European Union: Exploring the Capacities of Networked Governance.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at:
Putting agencies at the centre of a global framework is advantageous for a number
of reasons. First, it treats EU agencies as organisations that are interwoven with
different levels of government and different actors ( Toonen, T. (2010). Multilevel Governance and Intergovernmental Relations: Integrating
the Theoretical Perspectives. In E. Ongaro, A. Massey, M. Holzer, and E. Wayenberg
(eds.). Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States.
Theoretical perspectives (pp. 29-50). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.Toonen, 2010: 40). Interwovenness implies focusing on flexible arrangements (both formal and informal)
between actors (both institutional and noninstitutional) with the aim of coordinating
coherent responses ( Piattoni, S. (2010). The evolution of the studies of European Union MLG. In E. Ongaro,
A. Massey, M. Holzer and E. Wayenberg (eds.). Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States.
Theoretical perspectives (pp. 159-185). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.Piattoni, 2010: 160). In this sense, studying actors’ preferences and the compatibility of their goals
can benefit our overall understanding of the agency and the policy area being coordinated.
Second, research into the mezzo-level and its multiple actors seeks to better understand
the capacity they have to mobilise each other to achieve certain goals and how the
agency fits into this interaction. Finally, expanding the focus to include broad arrangements
between actors contributes to our understanding of agencies as conduits noninstitutional
actors use to channel their interests through member-state representatives but also
through EU institutions. This is how agencies have come to be seen as a critical part
of a complex picture based on interdependent actors and what makes them better adapted
to play a significant role in global governance processes. From this point, our study
opens up new lines of research beyond the Eurocentric view of agencies as being limited
to their immediate geographical boundaries. In fact, EU agencies can go beyond “the
coordination dilemma” affecting the EU as a whole ( Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2017). Researching European Union Agencies: What Have
We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)? Journal of Common Market Studies, 55 (4), 675-690. Available at:
[1] |
This study was supported by the TransCrisis project (grant number 649484) under the European Union Horizon 2020 programme. |
Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1), 3-32. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042001001. |
|
Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening International Regulation through Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 (2), 441-500. Available at: https://bit.ly/2K18aVN. |
|
Bevir, M. and Hall, C. I. (2011). Global Governance. In M. Bevir (ed). The SAGE Handbook of Governance (pp. 352-366). London: SAGE. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4135/ 9781446200964.n23. |
|
Blauberger, M. and Rittberger, B. (2015). Conceptualising and Theorising EU Regulatory Networks. Regulation and Governance, 9 (4), 367-376. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12064. |
|
Boin, A., Busuioc, M. and Groenleer, M. (2014). Building European Union Capacity to Manage Transboundary Crises: Network or Lead-Agency Model? Regulation and Governance, 8 (4), 418-436. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12035. |
|
Borrás, S., Koutalakis, C., and Wendler, F. (2007). European agencies and input legitimacy: EFSA, EMeA and EPO in the post-delegation phase. European Integration, 29 (5), 583-600. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330701694899. |
|
Buess, M. (2014). European Union Agencies and Their Management Boards: An Assessment of Accountability and Demoi-cratic Legitimacy. Journal of European Public Policy, 22 (1), 94-111. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.881299. |
|
Busuioc, M. (2013). European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699292. 001.0001. |
|
Busuioc, M. and Groenleer, M. (2012). Wielders of Supranational Power? The Administrative Behavior of the Heads of European Union Agencies. In M. Busuioc, M. Groenleer and J. Trondal (eds.). The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union (pp. 128-151). Manchester: Manchester University Press. |
|
Chamon, M. (2016). EU agencies: legal and political limits to the transformation of the EU administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784487.001.0001. |
|
Chiti, E. (2013). “European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment”. European Law Journal, 19 (1), 93-110. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12015. |
|
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2006). Agencification and Regulatory Reforms. Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. |
|
Christensen, T. and Nielsen, V. (2010). Administrative Capacity, Structural Choice and the Creation of EU Agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2), 176-204. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903561757. |
|
Coen, D. and Thatcher, M. (2008). Network Governance and Multilevel Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies. Journal of Public Policy, 28 (1), 49-71. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X08000779. |
|
Coman-Kund, F. (2018). European Union Agencies as Global Actors: A legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex and Europol. London: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351136860. |
|
Cutler, C., Haufler, V. and Porter, T. (eds) (1999). Private Authority and International Affairs. Albany: SUNY Press. |
|
Dauvergne, C. (2009). Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511810473. |
|
Dehousse, R. (2008). Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for a Multi-Principals Model. West European Politics, 31 (4), 789-805. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380801906072. |
|
Dohler, M. (2011). Regulation. In M. Bevir (ed). The SAGE Handbook of Governance (pp. 518-534). London: SAGE. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446200964.n33. |
|
Eberlein, B. and Grande, E. (2005). Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory State. Journal of European Public Policy, 12 (1), 89-112. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000311925. |
|
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009). National Agencies in the European Administrative Space: Government-Driven, Commission-Driven or Networked? Public Administration, 87 (4), 779-790. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01779.x. |
|
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2017). Researching European Union Agencies: What Have We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)? Journal of Common Market Studies, 55 (4), 675-690. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12525. |
|
Egeberg, M., Trondal, J. and Vestlund, N. (2015). The Quest for Order: Unravelling the Relationship between the European Commission and European Union Agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 22 (5), 609-629. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.976587. |
|
Eisner, M. A. (1993). Regulatory Politics in Transition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. |
|
Ekelund, H. (2014). The Establishment of FRONTEX: A New Institutionalist Approach. Journal of European Integration, 36 (2), 99-116. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.809345. |
|
European Commission (2016). EU Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa. Available at: https://bit.ly/1CMZ5ZA. |
|
Ferran, E. (2016). The existential search of the European banking authority. European Business Organization Law Review, 17 (3), 285-317. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-016-0048-9. |
|
Font, N. and Pérez Durán, I. (2015). The European Parliament Oversight of EU Agencies through Written Questions. Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (9), 1349-1366. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1076875. |
|
Galaz, V., Tallberg, J., Boin, A., Ituarte-Lima, C., Hey, E., Olsson, P. and Westley, F. (2017). Global Governance Dimensions of Globally Networked Risks: The State of the Art in Social Science Research. Risk, Hazards and Crisis in Public Policy, 8 (1), 4-27. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/rhc3.12108. |
|
Greer, S. L. (2012). The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: hub or hollow core? Journal of health politics, policy and law, 37 (6), 1001-1030. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-1813817. |
|
Greer, S. L. and Kurzer, P. (2012). European Union Public Health Policy Regional and global trends. London: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203077245. |
|
Groenleer, M. (2009). The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional Development. Delft: Eburon Uitgeverij BV. |
|
Heims, E. (2016). Explaining Coordination between National Regulators in EU Agencies: The Role of Formal and Informal Social Organization. Public Administration, 95 (4), 881-896. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12223. |
|
Heims, E. (2017). Regulatory Coordination in the EU: A Cross Area Comparison. Journal of European Public Policy, 24 (8), 1116-1134. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1206141. |
|
Howarth, D., Quaglia, L. and Gren, J. (2015). Supranational banking supervision in Europe: The construction of a credible watchdog. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 [s. 1]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12271. |
|
Jacobs, F. (2014). EU Agencies and the European Parliament. In M. Everson, C. Monda and E. Vos (eds.). European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States. The Netherland: Wolters Kluwer. |
|
Jacobson, P. D. (2012). The role of networks in the European union public health experience. Journal of Health Politics,Policy and Law, 37 (6), 1049-1055. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-1813836. |
|
Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006). The Coordination of the European Union: Exploring the Capacities of Networked Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286959.001.0001. |
|
Jordana, J. and Triviño-Salazar, J. C. (2018). The coordination capacity of EU agencies in transboundary crises: leading or following the crowd?. Joint Sessions, European Council for Political Research (ECPR), University of Nicosia. April 10-14 (Nicosia, Cyprus). |
|
Kelemen, D. (2002). The Politics of Eurocratic Structure and the New European Agencies. West European Politics, 25 (4), 93-118. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/713601644. |
|
Kelemen, D. and Tarrant, A. D. (2011). The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy. West European Politics, 34 (5), 922-947. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.591076. |
|
Keohane, R. (2001). Governance in a Partially Globalized World. American Political Science Review, 95 (1), 1-13. |
|
Krapohl, S. (2004). Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs. European Law Journal, 10, 518-538. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2004.00229.x. |
|
Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598 (1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272612. |
|
Levi-Faur, D. (2011). Regulatory Networks and Regulatory Agencification: Towards a Single European Regulatory Space. Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (6), 810-829. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.593309. |
|
Liverani, M. and Coker, R. (2012). Protecting Europe from diseases: from the international sanitary conferences to the ECDC. Journal of Health Politics, policy and law, 37 (6), 915-934. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-1813772. |
|
Maggetti, M. and Gilardi, F. (2014). Network Governance and the Domestic Adoption of Soft Rules. Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (9), 1293-1310. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.923018. |
|
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203439197. |
|
Majone, G. (2005). Dilemmas of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199274304.001.0001. |
|
Majone, G. (2016). European Integration and Its Modes: Function Versus Territory. TARN Working Paper, 2/2016. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2778612. |
|
Mathieu, E. (2016). Regulatory Delegation in the European Union: Networks, Committees and Agencies. London: Palgrave. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8. |
|
Merrill, R. A. (2003). Foreword (Special Issue on “Science in the Regulatory Process). Law and Contemporary Problems, 66, 1-6. |
|
Mezzetti, P. and Ceschi, S. (2015). Transnational Policy Networks in the Migration Field: A Challenge for the European Union. Contemporary Politics, 21 (3), 323-340. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2015.1061243. |
|
Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (4), 473-524. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x. |
|
Mossialos, E., Baeten, R., Permanand, G. and Hervey, T. K. (eds.). (2010). Health systems governance in Europe: the role of European Union law and policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750496. |
|
Niemann, A. and Speyer, J. (2018). A Neofunctionalist Perspective on the “European Refugee Crisis”: The Case of the European Border and Coast Guard. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56 (1), 23-43. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12653. |
|
Olsen, J. (2007). Europe in Search of Political Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
|
Ongaro, E., Massey, A., Wayenberg, E. and Holzer, M. (eds.) (2010). Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States: Theoretical Perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849807067. |
|
Ossege, C. (2016). European Regulatory Agencies in EU Decision-Making: Between Expertise and Influence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. |
|
Paul, K. (2012). The Europeanisation of Food Safety: A Discourse Analytical Approach. Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (4), 549-566. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.614136. |
|
Peters, G. and Wright, V. (2001). The National Coordination of European Policy Making. In J. J. Richardson (ed). European Union: Power and Policy Making, London: Routledge. |
|
Pérez-Durán, I. (2018). Interest Group Representation in the Formal Design of European Union Agencies. Regulation and Governance, 12, 238-262. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12150. |
|
Piattoni, S. (2010). The evolution of the studies of European Union MLG. In E. Ongaro, A. Massey, M. Holzer and E. Wayenberg (eds.). Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States. Theoretical perspectives (pp. 159-185). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. |
|
Pollack, M. (2003). The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford: Oxford. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199251177.001.0001. |
|
Pollitt, C. and Talbot, C. (eds.) (2004). Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation. London: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203507148. |
|
Puchala, D. (1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00165. |
|
Rhinard, M. (2009). European cooperation on future crises: toward a public good? Review of Policy Research, 26 (4), 439-455. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2009.00394.x. |
|
Rittberger, B. and Wonka, A. (2013). Agency Governance in the EU. London: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203722978. |
|
Rosenau, J. (1995). Governance in the Twenty-First Century. Global Governance, 1 (1), 13-43. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-001-01-90000004. |
|
Sabel, C. and Zeitlin, J. (eds.) (2010). Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
|
Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (2012). Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance. In E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (pp. 18-33). Oxford: Oxford University press. |
|
Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). What’s the news in “New Intergovernmentalism”? A critique of Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (4), 723-730. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12234. |
|
Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (3), 297-317. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501769780000011. |
|
Stubb, A., Wallace, H. and Peterson, J. (2003). The Policy-Making Process. In E. Bomberg and A. Stubb (eds.). The European Union: How Does It Work (pp. 136-155). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
|
Thatcher, M. (2011). The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and Its Limits: A Comparative Analysis of European Delegation. Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (6), 790-809. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.593308. |
|
Thatcher, M. and Coen, D. (2008). Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary Analysis. West European Politics, 31 (4), 806-836. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402380801906114. |
|
Toonen, T. (2010). Multilevel Governance and Intergovernmental Relations: Integrating the Theoretical Perspectives. In E. Ongaro, A. Massey, M. Holzer, and E. Wayenberg (eds.). Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the European Union and the United States. Theoretical perspectives (pp. 29-50). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. |
|
Trauner, F. (2016). Asylum Policy: The EU’s “Crises” and the Looming Policy Regime Failure. Journal of European Integration, 38 (3), 311-25. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756. |
|
Trondal, J. and Peters, B. G. (2013). The Rise of European Administrative Space: Lessons Learned. Journal of European Public Policy, 20 (2), 295-307. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.746131. |
|
van Kersbergen, K. and van Waarden, F. (2004). “Governance” as a Bridge Between Disciplines: Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy. European Journal of Political Research, 43 (2), 143-171. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00149.x. |
|
Vos, E. (2000). EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis. Journal of Consumer Policy, 23 (3), 227-255. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007123502914. |
|
Wonka, A. and Rittberger, B. (2010). Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies. West European Politics, 33 (4), 730-752. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003794597. |
|
Zürn, M. (2004). Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems. Government and Opposition, 39 (2), 260-287. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00123.x. |
|
Zürn, M. (2010). Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance. In H. Enderlein, S. Walti and M. Zürn (eds.). Handbook on Multi-Level Governance (pp 80-99). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. |
|
Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198819974.001.0001. |