We have been living extraordinary times. This pandemic is characterized by the magnitude of its impact: universal in scope, breakneck in its propagation speed, uniquely intrusive in our everyday lives and minds. Yet, on another level, we have been living ordinary times. Over the last decade, Europe’s “new normal” has been to face one crisis after another in a form of abnormality which has found expression in politics as decisionism (assisted by experts), in law as exceptionalism (in the form of states of emergency), and in mass and social media as polarisation (with a new kind of “infodemic”).[1] At the European level, the manner in which current events have unfolded also sounds all too familiar. It is not so different from the sequence of events experienced during the crises of the last ten years: the first reactions by some Member States came in the form of non-cooperative behaviours, there was a clear lack of coordination with European relations falling apart, then an improved cooperation arose at the EU level with the Commission serving as a broker, convergences between some Member States led to partial agreements, and it eventually culminated in last minutes compromises involving most if not all Member States and the mobilisation by Union institutions of unconventional instruments “in a spirit of solidarity.” This pattern emerged during the financial crisis in 2010, was repeated during the migration crisis in 2015 and is again observed following the Covid-19 outbreak.[2]
On one point, however, this crisis is different. This has to do with the revaluation
of the role of the state. During the previous crises, states were under fire, somewhat
humiliated, with some of them being accused of failing in keeping their finances or
migration flows under control. This led to a further delegation of power to the European
Union, to new forms of “executive federalism”. See recital 21 of Decision 1082/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health.
The idea of the state as a “survival unit” was developed by Norbert Elias ( Elias, N. (2001). The Society of Individuals. London: Continuum.
Joly, M. (2007). L’Europe de Jean Monnet. Paris: CNRS.
Where does the European Union stand in this context? On the one hand, the Union exposes
the vulnerability of the Europeans’ condition. The whole point of the EU machinery
and legal order is to create interdependencies between Member States, mainly in the
form of cross-border transactions and transnational social relationships, and to smoothly
manage the consequences of this interdependence. See, in particular, Communication from the Commission, Communication on the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and
Growth Pact, COM(2020) 123 final, 20 March 2020; Communication from the Commission, Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19
outbreak, 2020/C 91 I/01, 20 March 2020.
See, in particular, European Council, Report on the comprehensive economic policy response to COVID-19 pandemic, 9 April 2020; Eurogroup Statement on the Pandemic Crisis Support, 8 May 2020. See
also ECB, ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), 18 March 2020; ECB, Monetary policy decisions, 4 June 2020.
This pandemic has revealed a special attachment to human life within European societies. This is reflected in the fact that, in an unprecedented move, most Member States governments took the decision to interrupt the economic cycle and terminate social life. For a limited period of time, absolute priority was given to human life. The state and society mobilized all of their economic and moral resources with the sole aim of preventing deaths and saving the dying. This trumped all other considerations relating to economic growth, social or individual preferences. For some national leaders, we were “at war”, for others this was “the greatest challenge since World War II.” But what does this mean for the European Union and its law?
Human health is not absent from the EU law discourse. It is enshrined in the EU treaties
as an overarching objective and a fundamental requirement. See Arts. 6(a), 9 and 168 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and
Art. 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Judgment of the Court of 19 May 2009, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and others, Joined
Cases C-171/07 & C-172/07, EU:C:2008:729, par. 19; See already Judgment of the Court
of 20 March 1976, de Peiper, Case 104/75, EU:C:1976:67, par. 15.
As stated in Art. 6 TFEU, the competence of the EU in the health field is a complementary
competence limited to “actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of
the Member States”. This is reflected in the legal basis of Art. 168 TFEU. Only the
area of “common safety concerns in public health” is an area of shared competence
(Art. 4(2) k TFEU).
This expression makes sense in the context of a broader discourse which aims to express
respect for the sensitive nature of state regulation in this field, while embedding
it into the EU approach to economic integration. On the one hand, it means that Member
States are solely responsible for setting the level of protection they wish to maintain
and the best way to attain it. Judgment of the Court of 19 May 2009, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and others, Joined
Cases C-171/07 & C-172/07, EU:C:2008:729, par. 19.
On the economic-oriented approach of the Commission, see Commission staff working
document, Investing in Health, SWD (2103) 43 final, 20 February 2013.
Judgement of the Court of 8 June 2017, Medisanus, C-296/15, EU:C:2017:431, par. 89. Ibid., par. 99.
In Covid-19 times things are different. The lives and health of national citizens
is the “paramount consideration.” Communication from the Commission, Towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement and lifting
internal border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13 May 2020.
At this particular moment in the history of European integration, the Union is bound
to turn itself into an infrastructural good, set up for the very purpose of establishing
adequate platforms aimed at ensuring the preservation of life and keeping adequate
infrastructures from being destabilised or decimated. The notion of infrastructure is borrowed from Edwards ( Edwards, P. N. (2003). Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization
in the History of Sociotechnical Systems. Modernity and Technology, 1, 185-226.
What we have come to realise during this pandemic is “the interdependent character
of our bodily and social lives” (Butler, J. (2020). Mourning is a Political Act Amid the Pandemic and its Disparities.
Thruthout, 30-4-2020. Available at:
Interestingly, the Covid-19 outbreak prompted the UK government to seek access to
EU health cooperation. The Guardian, UK seeks access to EU health cooperation in light of coronavirus, 2 may 2020.
What then are these infrastructural conditions? The demand for infrastructural support
takes on three main forms. The first is a demand for knowledge. The pandemic has made
clear that the life of Europeans is largely dependent on the production of scientific
knowledge (Glaser, S. (forthcoming). L’Union européenne, une infrastructure vitale ? Enquête
sur le droit de la production des connaissances scientifiques en temps de crise. Le monde d’aujourd’hui. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.Glaser, forthcoming). This mainly concerns diagnostic tests, medical treatments, the search for a vaccine
and the development of modelling methods on virus spread. This calls for the setting
up of “knowledge infrastructures”, i.e. networks of researchers and institutions that
generate, share and maintain specific knowledge about the coronavirus disease (Edwards, P. N. et al. (2013). Knowledge Infrastructures: Intellectual Frameworks and Research Challenges. Ann Arbor: Deep Blue.Edwards et al., 2013). It has become clear that these networks cannot be handled nationally. Faced with
a global pandemic and a “highly dynamic epidemiology”, transnational and supranational
forms of coordination are needed (Eichler, H. G. et al. (2020). Clinical Trials for COVID-19: Can We Better Use the Short Window of Opportunity?
Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics. Available at:
See:
See:
See Regulation 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 establishing a European Centre for disease prevention and control.
EMA’s Rasi laments fragmented clinical trial efforts targeting COVID-19, at
The second form of infrastructural intervention concerns healthcare capacities. The
Member States’ healthcare systems, and in particular the hospital infrastructures,
have been severely strained by the pandemic. Sometimes it looked as if the main concern
of the national and European authorities was not directed towards preserving life
and preventing human suffering. Rather, it was about ensuring the resilience of state
capacities. But this is a misleading view. In Europe, the vision that human life depends
upon its infrastructural conditions of care and support is deeply rooted in society.
At the EU level, this was reflected in two series of actions. First of all, the EU
acted to protect the financing capacity of the healthcare systems in the Member States.
The Commission reactivated the Emergency Support Instrument, See Council Regulation 2020/521 of 14 April 2020 activating the emergency support
under Regulation 2016/369, and amending its provisions taking into account the COVID-19
outbreak.
See Regulation 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March
2020 amending Council Regulation 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance
to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are
seriously affected by a major public health emergency.
See Council Regulation 2020/521 of 14 April 2020 activating the emergency support
and Guidance from the European Commission on using the public procurement framework
in the emergency situation related to the COVID-19 crisis (2020/C 108 I/01), 1 April
2020.
This is the COVID-19 Clearing House for medical equipment. See also the European Cluster
Collaboration Platform supported by the Commission.
See Commission Implementing Decision 2020/414 of 19 March 2020 amending Implementing
Decision 2019/570 as regards medical stockpiling rescEU capacities.
Essential in pandemic times is the operation of integrated supply chains and production
lines. This is the third dimension of infrastructural Europe. As stated by the Commission,
the preservation of supply chains is “crucial to maintain availability of goods, in
particular of essential goods such as food supplies including livestock, vital medical
and protective equipment and supplies” (European Commission (2020a). Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability
of goods and essential services. Brussels: European Commission.European Commission, 16 March 2020a: 1). The fact that supply chains have been disrupted due to global shortage of critical
goods and trade and movement restrictions introduced within the European Union territory
by the Member States has generated a twofold reaction from the European Union. See Communication from the Commission, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final, 13 March 2020.
See Commission Implementing Regulation 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 making the exportation
of certain products subject to the production of an export authorisation.
Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the Green Lanes (2020/C
96 I/01), 24 March 2020.
The positioning of the Union and its law as a provider of infrastructural conditions bears consequences on the structuring of European societies. It both contributes to the persistence of a social world based on specific protections and exclusions, and to the emergence of a new perception of the European social space.
To begin with, this world pandemic has strengthened the assertion of the Union as
a “local community” (Marzal, T. (2020). From World Actor to Local Community: Territoriality and the Scope
of Application of EU Law. SSRN, 31-3-2020. Available at:
These operations are governed by Council Directive 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the
coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented
citizens of the Union in third countries.
See Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December
2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
See especially Judgment of the Court of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, Case C-182/15,
EU:C:2016:630.
Moreover, EU Covid-19 law confirms the divides structuring the European social space.
First of all, the impact of the crisis on countries will be deeply asymmetric, with
the worst hit countries being those dependent on large tourism, retail services sectors,
a high number of small business and air transport, in which remote work is less feasible,
and where the capacity to access credit on capital markets is the weakest (Dani, M., Mendes, J., Menendez, A. J., Wilkinson, M., Schepel, H., Chiti, E. (2020).
At the End of the Law. Verfassungsblog, 15-5-2020. Available at:
Council Regulation 2020/672 of 19 May 2020 on the establishment of a European instrument
for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following
the COVID-19 outbreak.
But infrastructural Europe is not only confirming pre-existing trends. It unveils
social positions that were previously largely overlooked. This is true in relation
to people who fulfil functions essential to ensuring a continuous flow of goods and
services. These are the carers, carriers, cashiers, cleaning women and men, drivers,
healthcare workers, domestic workers. Those, for whom remote work and teleworking
were hardly feasible, were actually the most exposed to occupational risks during
the pandemic. See:
These notions of “essential needs” and “critical functions” re-emerged during the
pandemic. They now have a tangible existence in law and policy. At the EU level, this
is reflected in the field of free movement and border controls. Member States were
requested to carve out exceptions to travel restrictions between Member States that
were deemed legitimate to protect the public health of populations. This was to permit
and facilitate “emergency transport services”, “the circulation of essential products”,
and “the crossing of frontier workers, in particular those working in the health care
and food sector, and other essential services (e.g. child care, elderly care, critical
staff or utilities)” (European Commission (2020a). Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability
of goods and essential services. Brussels: European Commission.European Commission, 16 March 2020a). It should be reminded that free movement rights may be restricted on grounds of public
health provided the safeguards laid down in Art. 29 of Directive 2004/38 are guaranteed.
See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States. See also Thym ( Thym, D. (2020). Travel Bans in Europe: A Legal Appraisal. Verfassungsblog, 19-3-2020. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/travel-bans-in-europe-a-legal-appraisal/.
This is borne out by the fact that the lifting of travel restrictions should be essentially
based on the “epidemiological situation in the Member States or sub-national areas”
(Communication from the Commission, Towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement and lifting
internal border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13 May 2020).
But, in Europe, there still remains a group of people that are treated as separate
despite living among us. The pandemic made the separation imposed on migrants even
more visible. Most vulnerable groups within the European population — elderly and
people suffering from chronic diseases — were recognised. See European Commission, Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures, 8 April 2020, p. 11.
See Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on EU Emergency Assistance on Cross-Border Cooperation in Healthcare related
to the COVID-19 crisis, C(2020) 2153 final, 3 April 2020. This is an extension of the Cross-Border Healthcare
Directive and Social Security Coordination Regulation: Directive 2011/24 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights
in cross-border healthcare; Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems. See,
by way of illustration, Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2014, Petru, C-268/13,
EU:C:2014:2271.
See:
The irony is that social distancing, identification, screening, risk-analysis and
transfers are not unknown to migrants. These are accepted techniques under EU law.
They reflect the fact that migrants, especially illegal migrants, are mostly seen
as a threat (a cultural, not biological threat) to be placed in the hands of institutions
and institutional cooperation (Azoulai, L. (2018). Le droit européen de l’immigration, une analyse existentielle.
Revue trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 54 (3), 519-539.Azoulai, 2018). As a result of EU migration law, migrants are put at a distance from “us” and “our
societies”, even if granted a legal status and whilst living among us, with almost
no possibilities to move and limited opportunities to develop social relationships.
The Guidance on the implementation of relevant EU migration law provisions published
by the Commission in April 2020 only exacerbated this trend. Communication from the Commission COVID-19: Guidance on the implementation of relevant
EU provisions in the area of asylum and return procedures and on resettlement (2020/C
126/02), 17 April 2020.
See, in particular, Judgment of the Court of 24 April 2018, MP, C-353/16 EU:C:2018:
276. Contrast with Judgment of 9 October 2014, Petru, C-268/13.
What this means is that migrants are deprived of access to the infrastructural conditions
of living offered to European citizens. Under EU Covid-19 law, migrants are not considered
structurally vulnerable persons. To get protected, they can only rely on particular
forms of personal vulnerability. The EU Guidance indicates that particular attention is due to “people with disabilities,
elderly or people with existing health concerns.”
It may be that infrastructural Europe is a time-limited endeavour designed to respond to a unique outbreak. It is certainly a precarious project. This is so in two aspects. I will briefly conclude with this.
The first aspect to mention is global vulnerability. This crisis has exposed our dependency
on external infrastructures, understood complexly as global supply value chains, digital
equipment, essential industries and world trade patterns. The Union’s institutions
long embraced the vision of an open and globalised world. However, the Commission
recently became aware of the downsides of this and, perhaps more importantly, of the
increasing popular challenges to it (European Commission (2017). Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation. Brussels: European Commission. Available at:
Art. 3(5) TEU. See European Commission, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment
and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s
strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening
Regulation), C(2020) 1981 final, 25 March 2020.
See European Commission, White paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign
subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, 17 June 2020.
See also Council of the European Union, The global response: Working together to help
the world get better, 2 May 2020.
Europeans do not live comfortably with this dual language. Today’s Europeans are subject
to colliding temptations. One is to “break their chains” and engage in deglobalisation.
The other is to suggest a transformation of the parameters within which infrastructures
function in Europe. This is the option favoured by the Commission: the recovery instrument
called Next Generation EU is presented as a decisive step towards the building of “a fairer, greener and more
digital Europe.” (European Commission (2020c). Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation. Brussels: European Commission. Available at:
Whatever one’s preference, it seems to me that the most important task facing us,
EU lawyers, is to take as an object of study the complex set of interdependences and
interconnections Europeans are embedded into, and pinpoint the many ways in which
law operates within it. Only this kind of work can allow one to reflect quietly and
seriously on wanted and unwanted chains (Latour, B. (2020). Imaginer les gestes-barrières contre le retour à la production
d’avant-crise. AOC [blog], 31-3-2020. Available at:
The second aspect concerns the representation of Europe and the precariousness of
its anchoring in society. Today’s Europe is not just the object of objective representations,
conveyed by institutions, policies and official symbols. It is the object of subjective
representations, that is, acts of appreciation and contestation. It generates social
passions and forms of affective polarisation (Azoulai, L. (2020). The Madness of Europe, Being Attached to It. German Law Journal, 21 (1), 100-103. Available at:
This is exemplified by the recent decision issued by the German Federal Constitutional
Court on the Public Sector Purchase Programme of the European Central Bank (Judgment
of 5 May 2020). The decision has been seen as “an affront to the core of EU constitutionalism”
(Avbelj, M., The Right Question about the FCC Ultra Vires Decision, Verfassungsblog, 6 May 2020).
[1] |
On exceptional legal arrangements following the Covid-19 outbreak, see Verfassungsblog, COVID 19 and States of Emergency, April 2020 (https://bit.ly/2BlZskD). |
[2] |
See Pacces and Wiemer (Pacces, A. M. and Weimer, M. (2020). From Diversity to Coordination: A European Approach
to COVID-19. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11 (2), 283-296. Available at:
|
[3] |
See, in relation to the Euro-crisis, Joerges (Joerges, C. (2014). Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of
a New Constitutional Constellation. German Law Journal, 15 (5), 985-1027. Available at:
|
[4] |
See recital 21 of Decision 1082/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health. |
[5] |
The idea of the state as a “survival unit” was developed by Norbert Elias (Elias, N. (2001). The Society of Individuals. London: Continuum.2001). See, in relation to Europe, Joly (Joly, M. (2007). L’Europe de Jean Monnet. Paris: CNRS.2007). |
[6] |
See de Witte (De Witte, F. (2018). Interdependence and Contestation in European Integration. European Papers, 3 (2), 475-509.2018). |
[7] |
See, in particular, Communication from the Commission, Communication on the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, COM(2020) 123 final, 20 March 2020; Communication from the Commission, Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, 2020/C 91 I/01, 20 March 2020. |
[8] |
See, in particular, European Council, Report on the comprehensive economic policy response to COVID-19 pandemic, 9 April 2020; Eurogroup Statement on the Pandemic Crisis Support, 8 May 2020. See also ECB, ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), 18 March 2020; ECB, Monetary policy decisions, 4 June 2020. |
[9] |
See Arts. 6(a), 9 and 168 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Art. 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. |
[10] |
Judgment of the Court of 19 May 2009, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and others, Joined Cases C-171/07 & C-172/07, EU:C:2008:729, par. 19; See already Judgment of the Court of 20 March 1976, de Peiper, Case 104/75, EU:C:1976:67, par. 15. |
[11] |
As stated in Art. 6 TFEU, the competence of the EU in the health field is a complementary competence limited to “actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States”. This is reflected in the legal basis of Art. 168 TFEU. Only the area of “common safety concerns in public health” is an area of shared competence (Art. 4(2) k TFEU). |
[12] |
Judgment of the Court of 19 May 2009, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and others, Joined Cases C-171/07 & C-172/07, EU:C:2008:729, par. 19. |
[13] |
On the economic-oriented approach of the Commission, see Commission staff working document, Investing in Health, SWD (2103) 43 final, 20 February 2013. |
[14] |
Judgement of the Court of 8 June 2017, Medisanus, C-296/15, EU:C:2017:431, par. 89. |
[15] |
Ibid., par. 99. |
[16] |
Communication from the Commission, Towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement and lifting internal border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13 May 2020. |
[17] |
See Walker (Walker, N. (2017). The European Public Good and European Public Goods. Manuscript available from the author.2017). |
[18] |
The notion of infrastructure is borrowed from Edwards (Edwards, P. N. (2003). Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems. Modernity and Technology, 1, 185-226.2003). |
[19] |
The Guardian, UK seeks access to EU health cooperation in light of coronavirus, 2 may 2020. |
[20] | |
[21] |
See: https://bit.ly/38fmFBk. |
[22] |
See Regulation 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a European Centre for disease prevention and control. |
[23] |
EMA’s Rasi laments fragmented clinical trial efforts targeting COVID-19, at https://bit.ly/3gafdKl. |
[24] |
See Council Regulation 2020/521 of 14 April 2020 activating the emergency support under Regulation 2016/369, and amending its provisions taking into account the COVID-19 outbreak. |
[25] |
See Regulation 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency. |
[26] |
See Council Regulation 2020/521 of 14 April 2020 activating the emergency support and Guidance from the European Commission on using the public procurement framework in the emergency situation related to the COVID-19 crisis (2020/C 108 I/01), 1 April 2020. |
[27] |
This is the COVID-19 Clearing House for medical equipment. See also the European Cluster Collaboration Platform supported by the Commission. |
[28] |
See Commission Implementing Decision 2020/414 of 19 March 2020 amending Implementing Decision 2019/570 as regards medical stockpiling rescEU capacities. |
[29] |
See Communication from the Commission, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final, 13 March 2020. |
[30] |
See Commission Implementing Regulation 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 making the exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorisation. |
[31] |
Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the Green Lanes (2020/C 96 I/01), 24 March 2020. |
[32] |
These operations are governed by Council Directive 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries. |
[33] |
See Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism. |
[34] |
See especially Judgment of the Court of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, Case C-182/15, EU:C:2016:630. |
[35] |
Council Regulation 2020/672 of 19 May 2020 on the establishment of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak. |
[36] |
See: https://bit.ly/38cNkP4. |
[37] |
It should be reminded that free movement rights may be restricted on grounds of public
health provided the safeguards laid down in Art. 29 of Directive 2004/38 are guaranteed.
See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States. See also Thym (Thym, D. (2020). Travel Bans in Europe: A Legal Appraisal. Verfassungsblog, 19-3-2020. Available at:
|
[38] |
This is borne out by the fact that the lifting of travel restrictions should be essentially based on the “epidemiological situation in the Member States or sub-national areas” (Communication from the Commission, Towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement and lifting internal border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13 May 2020). |
[39] |
See European Commission, Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures, 8 April 2020, p. 11. |
[40] |
See Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on EU Emergency Assistance on Cross-Border Cooperation in Healthcare related to the COVID-19 crisis, C(2020) 2153 final, 3 April 2020. This is an extension of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive and Social Security Coordination Regulation: Directive 2011/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare; Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems. See, by way of illustration, Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2014, Petru, C-268/13, EU:C:2014:2271. |
[41] |
See: https://bit.ly/2BkLiQT. |
[42] |
Communication from the Commission COVID-19: Guidance on the implementation of relevant EU provisions in the area of asylum and return procedures and on resettlement (2020/C 126/02), 17 April 2020. |
[43] |
See, in particular, Judgment of the Court of 24 April 2018, MP, C-353/16 EU:C:2018: 276. Contrast with Judgment of 9 October 2014, Petru, C-268/13. |
[44] |
The EU Guidance indicates that particular attention is due to “people with disabilities, elderly or people with existing health concerns.” |
[45] |
Art. 3(5) TEU. |
[46] |
See European Commission, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), C(2020) 1981 final, 25 March 2020. |
[47] |
See European Commission, White paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, 17 June 2020. |
[48] |
See also Council of the European Union, The global response: Working together to help the world get better, 2 May 2020. |
[49] |
This is exemplified by the recent decision issued by the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchase Programme of the European Central Bank (Judgment of 5 May 2020). The decision has been seen as “an affront to the core of EU constitutionalism” (Avbelj, M., The Right Question about the FCC Ultra Vires Decision, Verfassungsblog, 6 May 2020). |
Alemanno, A. (2020) The European Response to COVID-19: From Regulatory Emulation to Regulatory Coordination? European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11 (2), 307-316. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2020.44. |
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Azoulai, L. (2018). Le droit européen de l’immigration, une analyse existentielle. Revue trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 54 (3), 519-539. |
|
Azoulai, L. (2020). The Madness of Europe, Being Attached to It. German Law Journal, 21 (1), 100-103. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.104. |
|
Butler, J. (2020). Mourning is a Political Act Amid the Pandemic and its Disparities. Thruthout, 30-4-2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/2VsfIHA. |
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Confravreux, J. (2019). Le fond de l’air est jaune. Comprendre une révolte inédite. Paris: Seuil. |
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Dani, M., Mendes, J., Menendez, A. J., Wilkinson, M., Schepel, H., Chiti, E. (2020). At the End of the Law. Verfassungsblog, 15-5-2020. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/at-the-end-of-the-law/. |
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De Witte, F. (2018). Interdependence and Contestation in European Integration. European Papers, 3 (2), 475-509. |
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Editorial Comments (2017). EU law as a way of life. Common Market Law Review, 54 (2), 357–367. |
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