Autor
Palabras clave
Artículo 33 del Acuerdo ADPIC – Patentes – Duración mínima
Resumen
El TJCE se pronuncia sobre su competencia prejudicial para interpretar el artículo 33 del Acuerdo ADPIC de la OMC relativo a la duración mínima de la protección conferida por las patentes. Tras constatar que en este ámbito material la Comunidad no ha ejercido su competencia o que, al menos y en el plano interno, este ejercicio ha sido «insuficientemente importante», deduce que en la fase actual de la evolución del Derecho comunitario el precepto en causa corresponde a un ámbito en el que los Estados miembros tienen la «competencia principal» y en estas circunstancias el Derecho comunitario no se opone a que la disposición sea aplicada directamente por un órgano jurisdiccional nacional en las condiciones previstas por su Derecho interno. En este comentario se sostiene que en esta sentencia el TJCE clarifica el fundamento y alcance de su jurisdicción. Es plausible entender que el Tribunal no va a declinar en ningún caso su jurisdicción formal de admisibilidad, que fundamenta en el monopolio del que dispone para dirimir el reparto
vertical de competencias, mientras que hace depender su jurisdicción interpretativa respecto del fondo de la existencia de normativa comunitaria relevante.
vertical de competencias, mientras que hace depender su jurisdicción interpretativa respecto del fondo de la existencia de normativa comunitaria relevante.
Keywords
Article 33 of TRIPs Agreement – Patents – Minimum term of protection
Abstract
In this case the ECJ deals with the question of its jurisdiction to interpret
Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement under a preliminary ruling. For the Court, since
the Community has not yet exercised its powers in the sphere of patents or, at the very
least, at internal level, that exercise has not to date been of sufficient importance, one should
conclude that Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement forms part of a sphere in which, at the
present point in the development of Community law, the Member States remain principally
competent. In these circumstances, as Community legislation in the sphere of patents now
stands, it is not contrary to Community law for Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement to be
directly applied by a national court subject to the conditions provided for by national law.
This comment suggests that this case-law clarifies the basis and scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. It is plausible to understand that the Court will never decline its formal jurisdiction on admissibility, which constitutes the foundation of the monopoly of the Court to decide on the vertical distribution of powers between the EC and its Members States. The jurisdiction of the Court to exercise its interpretation on a particular subject matter, on the other
hand, depends on the existence of relevant Community law.
Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement under a preliminary ruling. For the Court, since
the Community has not yet exercised its powers in the sphere of patents or, at the very
least, at internal level, that exercise has not to date been of sufficient importance, one should
conclude that Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement forms part of a sphere in which, at the
present point in the development of Community law, the Member States remain principally
competent. In these circumstances, as Community legislation in the sphere of patents now
stands, it is not contrary to Community law for Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement to be
directly applied by a national court subject to the conditions provided for by national law.
This comment suggests that this case-law clarifies the basis and scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. It is plausible to understand that the Court will never decline its formal jurisdiction on admissibility, which constitutes the foundation of the monopoly of the Court to decide on the vertical distribution of powers between the EC and its Members States. The jurisdiction of the Court to exercise its interpretation on a particular subject matter, on the other
hand, depends on the existence of relevant Community law.