Autor
Palabras clave
COVID-19
crisis sanitarias
cláusula derogatoria
restricciones ordinarias
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos
estado de alarma.
Resumen
El establecimiento del estado de alarma en España debido a la pandemia de COVID-19 (Real Decreto 463/2020) no ha comportado, a nivel jurídico internacional, la invocación de la cláusula derogatoria del art. 15 del Convenio para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (CEDH) para amparar las medidas que afectan a los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el CEDH y sus protocolos. Otros diez Estados partes, en cambio, lo han hecho. Este hecho es relevante, primero, porque los parámetros interpretativos que mantiene el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) no descartan que la crisis sanitaria sea una amenaza excepcional que permita invocar la cláusula derogatoria. Y, segundo, porque no es fácil dirimir si las medidas anticrisis españolas responden a los estándares de necesidad y proporcionalidad de las restricciones ordinarias previstas en las disposiciones específicas del CEDH y sus protocolos (adecuadas para períodos de normalidad democrática) o si lo hacen adecuándose a los estándares derogatorios del art. 15 CEDH. Un análisis prospectivo, comparativo con otros Estados partes pero también específico de la práctica española, muestra cómo es factible que se compaginen ambas tipologías. Esto puede tener consecuencias jurídicas en el caso de que se presenten demandas ante el TEDH: si un Estado como España no ha notificado haber recurrido a la cláusula derogatoria, verá cómo todas sus medidas serán juzgadas conforme a los estándares de necesidad y proporcionalidad de las restricciones ordinarias, aunque por su configuración se aproximen a las medidas derogatorias.
Keywords
COVID-19; sanitary crisis; derogatory clause; ordinary restrictions; European Court of Human Rights; state of alarm.
Abstract
The declaration of the state of alarm in Spain (Royal Decree 463/2020) due to the COVID-19 pandemic has not, at the international legal level, been accompanied by invoking the derogation clause set out in Art. 15 of the European Convention on the protection of Human rights and Fundamental freedoms (ECHR) so as to legitimize measures affecting the rights and freedoms recognized in the ECHR and its Protocols. However, ten other States Parties have done so. This is relevant because the interpretative criteria maintained by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) do not exclude sanitary crises from constituting an exceptional threat that allows the derogation clause to be invoked. Additionally, it is not easy to say whether the Spanish measures comply with standards of necessity and proportionality of the ordinary restrictions provided for in the specific provisions of the Convention and its Protocols (appropriate in times of democratic normalcy) or if they do so in accordance with Art. 15 ECHR. A prospective analysis, comparing other States Parties but also specific to Spanish practice, shows how it is feasible for both categories of measures to
be combined. This may have legal consequences in the event of lawsuits before the ECtHR: if a State such as Spain has not notified that it has resorted to the derogation clause, all its measures will be judged in accordance with the standards of necessity and proportionality of ordinary restrictions although by their configuration some of them seem to be close to derogating measures.
be combined. This may have legal consequences in the event of lawsuits before the ECtHR: if a State such as Spain has not notified that it has resorted to the derogation clause, all its measures will be judged in accordance with the standards of necessity and proportionality of ordinary restrictions although by their configuration some of them seem to be close to derogating measures.